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[Tape One, Side One] 
JT: This is an interview with Bob Nicholas, an attorney with Baker and Hostetler 
[Houston, TX].  Bob Nicholas was general counsel to Exxon Shipping during the Exxon 
Valdez oil spill crisis in March of 1989.  Bob Nicholas is an expert on the Oil Pollution 
Act of 1990.  This is tape 1 of an oral history interview, Houston, Texas, by Jason Theriot 
on November 21, 2006, for Center for Public History, University of Houston.  Bob 
Nicholas on OPA 1990. 
BN: O.K.  My name is Bob Nicholas.  I am in admiralty law or maritime lawyer and 
have been involved in this practice of the law for over 35 years right now.  In fact, I have 
been licensed to practice law in the state of Texas for 40 years.  I was originally from 
Port Arthur, Texas.  I was born and raised there.  I went to undergraduate school at Lamar 
University in Beaumont and went to law school at the University of Texas in Austin.  
After graduating from law school, I went to work in New York City for the Marine 
Department of Gulf Oil Corporation when it was still around and from there, I went back 
to Beaumont and ended up working for the City of Beaumont for a very short period of 
time and then for the United States Attorney's office, Department of Justice.  I was there 
4 years as an assistant United States attorney and from there, I went to work in August of 
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1973 for Exxon Corporation over in Houston, Texas, and I was there for about 25 years.  
During that time, I served primarily as in-house marine or maritime counsel and at the 
time of the Exxon Valdez event, I was general counsel of Exxon Shipping Company 
which had been made into a separate affiliate of Exxon Corporation to operate the U.S. 
flag Jones Act fleet of ships which, at one time, consisted of about 21 ships.  In addition 
to the ships, the Exxon Shipping also operated a fairly large inland fleet of tow boats and 
barges designed primarily to move product, different types of oil, lube oils, motor 
gasoline, things like that.  Between the different Exxon refineries in the south, principally 
the Baton Rouge refinery located on the Mississippi River and the Baytown refinery 
located here on the eastern Ship Channel. 
JT: So, why did you get involved in the maritime law?  What was your driving 
passion in order to go into that field? 
BN: Well, it is interesting.  When I was in law school or actually, in undergraduate 
school, I was very interested in international law but that is kind of . . . whether or not 
you can actually get into practicing that is . . . the problem with international law is it 
involves a lot of things.  Anyway, I thought that was what I was kind of interested in. But 
in law school, I finally was able to take a course in maritime law or admiralty law and 
really, really enjoyed that.  And I had the opportunity to go to work after law school for 
Gulf Oil Marine department in New York City.  I thought that was going to be a lot of 
fun working on the business side and it was for a while but I realized that I was kind of 
wasting the legal education I had obtained and there really was not a lot going on the 
legal side.  I was really working on the commercial side.  So, I decided, after talking to 
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several people up there, that what I really wanted to do or thought I wanted to do was to 
get into the law practice side of family law. 
 I came back to Beaumont in anticipation of possibly working for a law firm there 
that did maritime work and ended up first working there for a few months for the City of 
Beaumont.  And then, I ended up working for the United States Attorney's Office for a 
period of about 4 years.  During that time, I was able to actually do some maritime trial 
work, working with the attorneys in Washington, D.C. and the old admiralty shipping 
section of the Department of Justice. And roughly 4 years later, I decided that I wanted to 
get out and I decided, well, I'd look around for law firms.  I really did not know which 
way I wanted to go.  I knew I wanted to try to stay in the maritime area.  So, I ended up 
interviewing and getting a job with Exxon and the reason they hired me was to be their 
specialized in-house marine counsel.  And when I first went to work there, there was just 
one of the lawyers that worked for, at that time, what was called the Marine Department 
of Exxon Company USA and later, for tax reasons, Exxon Shipping Company was 
actually activated in the ship's transfer to that entity and that became the operating 
company for the Exxon Corporation owned domestic US flag fleet of tankers, towboats 
and barges.  And that was the company that I was general counsel of from the time that it 
took over operations of the American flag fleet until the time of the Exxon Valdez until 
shortly thereafter when SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. was formed. 
JT: Let's back up just a little bit.  Your father, you had mentioned to me, he was in the 
U.S. Navy? 
BN: Yes, during World War II.  Not stationed on ships, however.  He was in the Naval 
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Air Corps and was stationed primarily in Florida during the war.  He was an aviation 
gunner or aerial gunner in a TBF like President Bush flew in World War II and was 
stationed on the East Coast conducting anti-submarine activities all up and down the East 
Coast.  The do some convoy duty.  They would kind of fly over convoys that protect 
convoys from U-boat attacks, that type of thing during the war. 
JT: So, with a father in the Navy growing up right along the coast in Port Arthur, I am 
sure all of that combined had something to do with your interest in a career in the waters. 
BN: Oh, absolutely.  I have been fascinated by ships since I was a child, and that 
probably has more to do with anything else.  I still have that fascination.  I love the salt 
water.  Lakes don't count! 
JT: Well, let's talk about that telephone call that you received on March 24, 1989.  
What was your immediate reaction? 
BN: Well, it is hard to put this in perspective to some degree because I was very used 
to getting calls whenever there would be a casualty on one of the ships or one of the tows 
and doing that at that time for, I'll say 1989, not quite 20 years, but for quite a while 
there, I was used to getting these calls at all times of the day or night and having to go 
somewhere and catch an airplane, fly somewhere or go down to Baytown or go over to 
Baton Rouge, you know, conduct a casualty investigation, go on board the ship, go on 
board the boat or whatever it was that was involved.  At first, this, to me, was just another 
one of these calls.  The call that I received was from the marine advisor at the time, 
Captain Bill Duncan, a British master mariner who served in that capacity until 1992 
when he retired but Bill called me.  I remember I was about to leave my house.  It was 
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Good Friday.  It was a holiday and I was on my way down to my sailboat and I was just 
packing stuff in the car and my wife came out and said, "There is a phone call from 
Captain Duncan."  So, I went in there and got on the phone and the first thing I heard was  
that the Exxon Valdez had run aground in Prince William Sound and that I needed to get 
to the Intercontinental Airport to meet at the Exxon navitat, so that . . . there was a group 
gathering there to fly up to Valdez.  So, I packed my bag.  It was kind of funny—I 
remembered one of the things I packed was a suit, anticipating that I might have to go to 
some kind of Coast Guard hearing.  I mean, everything I was prepared for was the routine 
that I had been involved in for many years.  As it turned out though, the reality and the 
magnitude of Valdez was totally different.  It was a totally completely different 
experience from anything I had ever had involving a marine casualty up to this point.  
And, of course, that is because of the huge media blitz and the large amount of oil that 
was spilled which was more of an environmental event than it was just a pure ship 
casualty.  And the fact that it was a huge environmental event dictated the type of 
response.  And again, this was, as I said, as an environmental event too, the response was 
more aimed at the containment and clean up efforts after the event.  The salvage of the 
ship and what happened to the ship afterwards was of little consequence at the time given 
the magnitude of the oil spill. 
 I left home and drove my old GMC pickup truck up to Intercontinental and sat 
there and waited.  I remember Captain Duncan and, of course, Frank Iarossi, who was the 
president of Exxon Shipping Company, Craig Rassinier who was the environmental guy 
in the shipping company.  I can't remember the guy's name that was from the claims 
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group…Marston.  I can't remember his name.  His last name was Marston.  And then, 
there was a guy who was on there with us who was an expert, I believe, in the use of 
dispersants.  He was not an Exxon employee but he went up on the plane with us.  There 
were 5 or 6 of us, I believe.  I can't remember if there was anybody else or not.  But we 
left Intercontinental and flew from there to Seattle and landed at Boeing Field in the rain . 
. . it was kind of a miserable day—kind of reflected the mood . . . and refueled there and 
headed up to Alaska from there.  When we got into Prince William Sound, I can 
remember we flew over the ship and the oil at that time was one huge slick that you could 
see out in the middle of Prince William Sound.  This was before it had dispersed and 
blown to all over the place up there by the heavy weather that occurred two days later.  
But anyway, after we landed . . . well, actually, it is kind of interesting . . . the pilots that 
flew us up there had never landed at the airport in Valdez.  On the one side, you've got 
mountains and then you've got kind of a little piece of flat land where the airport is and 
the runways are.  They did a fly by before they actually landed to get a good look at the 
place.  And then, we landed there some time, I guess, local time between 3 and 4 in the 
afternoon.  We were met by Captain . . . oh Lord, I am having such a hard time 
remembering names . . . one of the other . . . we had actually flown in another master 
from the West Coast, Bill Deppy, Captain Deppy . . . met us there. I was asked to take 
him out to the ship and relieve Joe Hazelwood, Captain Hazelwood, and find out what 
happened and come back.  And I went out there with Mr. Marsten.  He and I went 
together just the two of us.  Went on a small, I guess it was a fishing boat.  It looked 
smaller . . . out there and we didn't arrive until after dark.  The ship was still lit up.  The 
water was very calm out there at the time.  There were floating piece of ice all over the 
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place.  In fact, as we approached the ship, the person piloting the small boat that we were 
on turned on a spotlight to pick their way through the ice pieces.  And we were about 
halfway there when the light burned out.  And I could remember thinking, oh, boy, it is 
going to be fun.  We are going to have to go back through this in the dark.  But got to the 
ship and went on board.  And, of course, with the captain and with the third mate, [Greg] 
Cousins, who was the actual mate on watch at the time of the grounding, spent some time 
with them talking to them about what had happened, just kind of . . . I wanted to get a 
rough thumbnail sketch of what their remembrance of the event was and that type of 
thing and that is what I did.  Then, I went about gathering documents. 
 The state of Alaska had someone on board and so did the Coast Guard the whole 
time that the ship was there.  And they, of course, followed me around and wanted copies 
of everything.  I made copies.  There was no hiding anything.  We provided them copies 
of all of the ship's documents, documents that I would use and experts would use later on 
to actually retrace the baths of the ship and the reconstruction of the track of the vessel 
prior to the time of the grounding and that is what I was doing.  Got to leave the ship 
about midnight. 
 From the human side, one of the more interesting things that happened was when 
I got off the ship . . . of course, getting on and off the ship, we were using a pilot's ladder 
which was basically a rope ladder with boards and you go straight up and down the side 
of the ship.  And when we left, I, for some reason, was one of the first ones to go down 
onto the boat and come down the ladder.  If you had a briefcase or anything with you, 
they usually would tie it onto a separate rope and lower that down to you.  So, I got down 
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to the boat and Captain Hazelwood, I guess they started lowering his bag and other stuff 
and I was there on deck untying the stuff and getting it.  And then, he came down and he 
was standing near the stern, they were against the starboard rail of the little fishing boat 
that we were on.  And I happened to glance over to him and he was looking back up at 
the ship very glassy-eyed and teary-eyed and for a moment there, I had the thought of the 
scene from Lord Jim [1965].  In the movie, Peter O'Toole had been an officer on a ship 
hauling pilgrims to some event and the ship was in heavy weather. They panicked and 
thought it was going down.  He got off the ship with some of the other officers and they 
abandoned the ship and left it out there with all the people on board it to die, thinking the 
ship was going to founder.  Anyway, after they had abandoned ship, they were actually 
picked up and brought into harbor and, of course, they told the story of how this terrible 
event with the ship and the weather and the heavy weather, the ship was sinking, going 
down; they were the only survivors.  Well, when they get into harbor . .. . I don't know 
where they are at, Singapore or some place in the Far East . . . and I can't remember now 
from the story.  He starts down the ladder like Hazelwood coming down the pilot ladder 
and he looked off into the harbor at ships anchored there and there is the ship.  It didn't 
sink.  And he knew his whole career and whole life was over because he had lied, this 
kind of thing. But Joe had that look on his face like, my life is over, my career is over.  
I'll never go to sea again.  Those kinds of things.  This all took place in a matter of 
seconds.  It takes a lot longer to tell it than it actually did.  It was just more of a feeling 
that I got than anything else but there are lots of little stories like this, the human side of 
this of the terrible event that occurred throughout the whole time that I was there, 
different times. 
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JT: I think it is also interesting how you note the trip to the Valdez in the small vessel 
as you are dodging the large icebergs and the light goes out.  It is almost as a small scale 
probably what was occurring on the Valdez as far as the weather, the icebergs, the 
darkness, you know. I know that you had mentioned before that Prince William Sound is 
very, very dark at night and so you, with your experience as a maritime attorney, all the 
years and life experience that you bring and yet, you probably getting a sense of how 
dark and how spooky and how really the weather played a factor in all of this. 
BN: Oh, no question about it.  In fact, my other hobby is, of course, sailing and I have 
been sailing up and down this coast, the Pacific, down in the Caribbean and different 
places for many, many years and have been a pilot in my own sail boats here, there, and 
yon and you get off the coast here and as you approach the major metropolitan areas, 
you've got light pollution coming from everywhere.  The sky is lit up.  You can see lights 
for miles.  When you get to a place like Prince William Sound and there are mountains all 
around and there are no large population centers so you don't have any huge 
concentrations of light being reflected off the cloud layer or anything like that, and 
everything was so covered with snow so that can get some light but if there is no light 
there to be reflected, it is extremely dark.  It was very, very dark when out there that 
night, as I recall.  I mean, when you saw the ship finally, it was all lit up, just ablaze with 
lights because it was the only light you were looking at out there.  But yes, I can imagine 
going through there and it being that dark, especially if you have cloud cover.  And it was 
kind of cloudy.  In fact, I don't remember very many clear nights.  One night, we did have 
some clear weather and we had had a very interesting display of the Aurora Borealis one 
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night and that was the strangest thing I've ever seen because it was pitch black and you 
could see these colors of this thing moving around in the sky.  And you expected it to 
make noise but there was just complete silence and you are looking up at these strange 
shapes tearing in the sky.  But anyway, that was a few nights later on that we actually got 
to see the Aurora.  
JT: Will you briefly explain what occurred in those 30 minutes when the ship actually 
maneuvered off course to avoid the icebergs and just explain briefly what happened in 
those few moments. 
BN: I am doing this from memory because there is a lot better information available in 
books now and whatever else but as I recall, they had on the outbound passes, they had 
gotten some information from a ship that had left earlier that there was a considerable 
amount of ice in the traffic lanes.  Prince William Sound has a traffic separation scheme 
in place—this is an IMO [International Maritime Organization] dedicated traffic 
separation area.  What that means is you have designated . . . if you look on a navigation 
chart of the area, you will see there are designated lanes for inbound and outbound traffic.  
In the separation scheme, there is a zone between the two, the south and northbound 
lanes.  There was a separation zone between the two.  They were outbound, of course, in 
the southbound lane and had requested from the Coast Guard vessel traffic servicing the 
area—the Coast Guard maintains the vessel traffic service—they operate radar and can 
actually see the ships as they go in and out on radar.  They requested permission to leave 
the lane to go around some ice and as I was told by Captain Hazelwood, he had instructed 
the mate on watch before he left the bridge to turn back into the traffic lanes when they 
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got a beam of, or that means directly adjacent to Buzbee Island Light.  And there is a 
little rock protrusion sticking up where they have a navigation aid on it and it blinks at 
night.  At that point, it was supposed to turn back into the traffic lanes.  I noticed from 
looking at the chart, a piece of the chart that I had copied that was being used at night, 
there was a position marked just inside the southbound lane and then the next position 
almost due south, 180 degrees south from there.  There was another position marked on 
the chart directly abeam of or adjacent to Buzbee Island Light.  While this point was 
marked on the chart, you can look further south and see the point of impact on the area 
nearby Bligh Reef.  Bligh Reef is shown on the chart as a reef but it is really just shallow 
water with lots of rocks.  There are no reefs up in the traditional sense of a coral reef or 
anything like that up there.  There is a light also that marks the reef and if you were 
southbound in the direction they were going, then that light would have appeared off your 
starboard bough or off to the right of the forward end of the ship.  Actually, the lookout, 
the person sailing is A.B. who happened to be a third mate, by the way, reported the light 
on the starboard side but for some reason, the ship did not begin to turn until it was too 
far south and in the vicinity of the shallow water where it actually went aground.  And it 
is interesting in looking at the course recorder which is a recording device that is attached 
to the ship that operates off of and takes signals from the ship's gyrocompass.  And that 
device, in my mind, indicated the ship, for about 10 minutes, was on autopilot.  The mate 
on watch at the time told me or indicated that they had taken it off autopilot, had started 
to turn but obviously the ship did not turn.  You know, there has been that doubt in 
everyone's mind of what actually really happened during that period of time.  Obviously, 
the ship didn't turn.  Obviously, it went aground.  As to what actually happened, if I were 
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to guess, it would be pure speculation.  But obviously, the facts are as they are.  The ship 
did not turn.  They did not go back into the traffic lanes when they were a beam off 
Buzbee Island Light.  But I have often wondered about that 10 minute segment of time 
and that actually happened in there.  If they actually had not been able to disengage or 
thought they had disengaged the autopilot, all of those types of things have been 
speculated on. 
JT: What was the speed of the vessel? 
BN: The speed was, as I calculated it, was roughly 12 knots.  They were building up to 
sea speed at the time so when I looked through the ship's documents and looked at the 
automatic bell recorder.  The bell recorder is . . . in the old days on steam ships, when you 
gave an engine command with the ship's telegraph, this was a mechanical device that 
indicated the speed or direction of the ship, and the engine room would respond by 
answering on this mechanical device.  They actually had to turn the boughs to open the 
steam and increase speed—that type of thing.  But this was an automatic device that 
automatically logged in the engine commands as given from the bridge.  This was a 
bridge controlled vessel.  And these were automatically printed out in the bell logger in 
the engine room.  And I noticed that at one point in time, in the actual one of the ship's 
documents referred to as the "bell book" that was kept on the bridge, at one point in time, 
the bell book . . . LPU, low program . . . what I was referring to is an entry in the deck 
bell book which shows at actually 1121:52, so that would be 9 o'clock, around 9 local 
time . . . no 2352, so that would be 8 minutes to midnight . . . the designation LPU or low 
program . . . the ship was equipped with a large slow stroke diesel engine and to increase 
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speed, there was a computer program that actually works with the engine controller to 
increase the speed up to sea speed in an efficient manner that will not do damage to the 
engine.  And so, the speed that I calculated at the time, just using time and distance 
traveled, computing that from the chart, estimated the speed to be about 12 knots or less 
than 12 knots, 11 point. . .  
JT: But it was building? 
BN: But it was building.  It was increasing.  The velocity of the ship was increasing. 
JT: Did the run-aground on the rock, did that stop its forward motion or did it pull 
back on the engines? 
BN: They attempted to get off, as I understand it from talking to Captain Hazelwood, 
but this quickly found out that they were stuck fast and the ship would not move.  They 
had done a tremendous amount of damage to the bottom of the ship, especially along one 
side.  I can't remember if it was the port or starboard side but it ripped out a lot of the 
bottom.  Of course, when you rip the bottom out on a single hulled ship, the cargo comes 
out of the ship and the oil spills.  I remember talking to the chief mate who… [Tape One, 
Side One ends] 
[Tape One, Side Two starts] the level of ullage, the ullage is the outage in a tank and 
you stop usually loading the tank when it is about 3 feet or so from the top of the deck, 
the deck level.  And I remember him saying to me he estimated he was losing oil out of 
the ship at about 260,000 barrels an hour.  So, I mean, it was pouring out of there from 
underneath and coming back up.  Of course, when I first saw the ship and it was sitting 
there, actually, it didn't look anything out of the normal.  It just looked like it was stopped 
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in the location that it was in. 
JT: What about the flyover you mentioned you saw some of the damage? 
BN: You could see the oil. 
JT: Was that something that you were expecting to see? 
BN: You could see the oil but it was massive.  What I remember about the oil slick and 
how massive it was . . . there was a small vessel that looked like it was attempting to 
string out some boom but the oil slick was 1,000 times larger.  I mean, it looked like a toy 
on one end with a little string of boom and here is this massive slick which I guess 
extended out several miles away from the vessel.  So, they would have had to had a 
thousand times more boom.  This is my guess.  I am just saying what it looked like and I 
kind of remember from my fuzzy memory of flying over and looking down at it.  But it 
would have been a lot more boom that was needed to actually surround this huge massive 
slick. 
JT: So, when you and Hazelwood leave the ship, this is essentially when your job 
really beings as far as the location is concerned? 
BN: Yes.  Now, I was not actually involved in the litigation, really, and when lawsuits 
got filed and that kind of thing.  What my job was while I was there was to work with the 
company and handle the paperwork needed to do the salvage effort.  One of the things I 
remember doing while I was there was on Easter Sunday night, they came to me and they 
were starting to try to acquire equipment for the clean-up crews to go out and work.  
They had a landing craft of some kind and they wanted to charter this, and there was 
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some issue of it was not a Coast Guard certified vessel so they could not take passengers 
for hire.  And I talked to the Coast Guard, I said, "You know, what they used to do in the 
Gulf of Mexico was to do a time charter with a manning agreement on the side with the 
owner of the vessel.  They would time charter the boat to the new oil company and then 
do a manning agreement giving the owner the right to man the vessel."  So, we did 
something like that.  Well, what made it interesting was I had no forms with me and I 
actually had to draw these contracts and these documents up from memory in long-hand.  
And it took me several hours to do this, a couple of hours at least, to write these out from 
memory, write out a time charter party from memory what I wanted to put in it and the 
terms and provisions of a normal time charter for that type—like for a supply boat or an 
offshore vessel— that type of thing.  It was what I was working off of from memory and 
stuff. 
JT: So, Texas law school did well then? 
BN: I guess so, or actually having worked for Exxon long enough . . . I had a lot of 
experience in drafting those types of documents, reviewing, drafting and preparing, but it 
wasn't until several days later that I was actually able to get some forms in, had them fax 
me some forms and then we redid some of those contracts.  And, of course, a lot of them 
got redone after I had left there.  I was up there 15 days from March 24, 15 days to the 
day; I left the day that ship was floated off the reef.  They floated her off the . . .  
JT: Where were you staying this time?  Was it [Valdez] offshore? 
BN: Yes.  For a few days, we were staying in some hotel there in Valdez and then 
there was an apartment somewhere that we got. That was kind of funny.  This was a two 
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bedroom apartment that could sleep maybe 4 people and we were taking the mattresses 
off the beds and putting people on the floor and sleeping 6 or 8 people in there at a time. 
JT: What was the mood at the time?  I mean, I am sure you guys got up and went and 
had breakfast and coffee every day.  What was the mood of the locals and of the media 
and of the people involved in Exxon? 
BN: Well, of course the media was very hostile.  It was difficult to do your job 
sometimes.  I had called and got some help, had two or three of the lawyers and we had 
people coming up helping out.  After that, the litigators finally got there.  Charles 
Matthews who is now General Counsel of Exxon Mobile Corporation came up.  He was a 
litigator in Houston at the time and he came up and so did Bob Woods from New 
Orleans, one of the other lawyers.  I had a lawyer from Seattle, Paul Daigle, came up and 
was helping out.  In fact, Paul got there the next day and they were a lot of help.  What 
we did was we tried to stay out of the limelight.  It was a lot easier if people did not know 
who we were for us to do our job behind the scenes.  I went back to the ship several times 
to interview people, take people off.  I went back the very next day to take Cousins, the 
third mate, off, bring him back. 
 That was kind of an interesting story there.  I had gotten him off the ship and 
down onto the boat where it was going to take us back and in the meantime, a reporter 
had gotten on the ship, flown out there on a helicopter and they were all upset about that 
so we got the guy off and down also onto the boat but we were going to go back on.  I 
remember telling Cousins, I said, "One thing I want you to do the whole way back is 
don't talk to anybody on the boat."  So, we went all the way back and he went up forward 
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and laid down in the bunk up there and basically slept the whole way back. 
 The trip back was unbelievable.  We had hit the bad weather that was coming in, 
stayed there for the next several days.  This is a 30 foot boat, open in the back, very cold 
and we were in really some rough weather, slugging it out right into the teeth of this wind 
coming out of the north.  We were heading due north.  We finally got back.  But I always 
thought that was kind of funny because we had this reporter on the boat and I had the 
third mate who had grounded the ship on the boat and this guy never knew who he was.  
He was inches away from probably the biggest story of his life and never knew it. 
JT: You guys kept it under wrap pretty good? 
BN: Well, we wanted to get these guys out of there.  One of the things we did for 
Hazelwood and for him was to actually help get them their own lawyers because we 
knew the Coast Guard would probably be coming after them.  Didn't know what else, so 
we wanted them to be represented. 
JT: And these guys were Exxon employees as well so there was some level of loyalty, 
we've got to protect these guys? 
BN: Yes.  We have always done that.  In fact, my role as company attorney was 
always to, you know, when I went out there, I said, "I am here representing the company.  
I cannot represent you personally."  I usually made it a point if, given the severity of the 
event or whatever it was, from experience, I would know whether or not I thought their 
license might be in jeopardy from the Coast Guard in license proceeding or potential 
criminal liability.  I had run into that before in casualty investigations and I would 
usually, even if the Coast Guard were there investigating, I would always insist that we 
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stop the investigation and get counsel with these people as there was a potential for this at 
some point in time.  And that obviously was my foremost thought going out there that 
night given the magnitude of what happened.  So, we were able to get counsel for these 
people after they were off the ship. 
JT: So, for the next 15 days, you and your crew went to work.  Now, as I recall, you 
mentioned you began at Exxon in 1973, correct? 
BN: Yes. 
JT: And this occurred in 1989, so you have got well over 15 years with the company 
plus the years of experience before.  Had there been anything in your previous career that 
could prepare you for those 15 days up there?   Did you feel that you were prepared well 
enough? 
BN: You just did the best you could.  The worst problem you had up there was the 
constant bombardment of things changing, having to do stuff so rapidly and so quickly, 
and not being able to get hardly any sleep.  I mean, I would go for days.  You'd be up 20 
hours . . . I don't think I ever stayed up 24 hours but I know I was up those first few days 
probably a good 20 hours a day or more, and it takes its toll on you after a while.  I saw 
people walk around that were like zombies, barely able to function after that length of 
time but it was just this constant bombardment.  And that takes . . . the stress is 
unbelievable.  Any casualty I had ever been involved on before, I mean, it is very tense at 
the beginning and what you go through during the investigation.  You have to go to a 
Coast Guard hearing immediately, you know, you've got that to go through.  Then it is 
over.  And this was only the beginning.  This continued for months on end.  Well, months 
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and years.  The intensity changed but the impact of all this continued on for years.  And 
even after the early 1990s at SeaRiver, we were, at that point in time, getting ready for 
the trials to take place, that kind of thing.  Like I said, when I was up there, I did some of 
the initial interviewing and I worked on the types of things that were necessary to get the 
ship salvaged and out of there and did some contract work and that kind of thing, always 
providing legal advice usually orally.  And when I came back, instead of being involved 
in the claims or litigation piece of it, I got involved again in the day-to-day running of the 
shipping company which was severely impacted by all this that had gone on. 
JT: So, what happened at the end of the 15 days?  Did you finally come home? 
BN: Yes.  By that time, it is kind of interesting.  I had accumulated a lot of documents 
and papers and things that I had gotten off the ship.  We had some other things that we 
wanted to get out of there like that.  In order to maintain the proper control and custody 
of this material, I realized there was no way that I could fly commercial because I would 
have had to check all this stuff and it would be out of my possession.  So, I remember 
telling them, I said, "You've got to find me a way out of here where all of this stuff that is 
with me can stay with me." 
JT: The ship documents? 
BN: Yes.  I had boxes of stuff and some other things as potential exhibits and things 
that we wanted to look at and analyze.  So, I told them, "I can't fly commercial.  Get me 
out of here on some other kind of aircraft."  And, at one time, I was looking at a C130 
that was going to be going back.  But as it turned out, of course, they had Exxon security 
up there and everything was kind of tight because there were death threats against Frank 
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and other people in the company.  So, the security was very tight.  And on the 15th day 
when I left, I had been down there and they were floating the ship off.  I went back . . . 
well actually, at that time, that day, I was told by one of the security people to go on back 
and be ready to leave and not to tell anybody.  So, I went back and I packed up and I got 
a call, "come now to the airport."  So, I did and I went in there and met one of the guys.  I 
didn't see the plane or anything around.  And they started jacking with me and telling me 
well, it was a hoax; that I really wasn't going out that day.  And after I guess they had 
seen this long look on my face of oh my God, how much longer am I going to be here 
kind of look, they took me over where the plane was kind of behind this building on one 
side.  I unloaded all my boxes and we flew from there down to . . . Frank Iarossi was on 
the plane and we flew back to Seattle, stopped at a private terminal there in Seattle and 
we were met there by lawyers from Seattle who picked up all the documents and all that 
stuff that we had maintained our chain of custody of the materials and stuff that we 
brought.  That plane went back to Alaska and they flew another plane up from Houston to 
pick us up.  We got home about 2 o'clock in the morning.  I was so delighted to be home 
after that [laughs].  But, again, that was tough.  That was a tough 15 days.  It was really 
only the beginning…after that, after we got back—all the work we had to do and things 
we had to . . . oh, I don't know, just one thing after the other to analyze.  It was very, very 
stressful for a very long time after that. 
JT: Let's talk about the ship. What kind of changes it was going through in those 15 
days.  At what point did it finally stop leaking? 
BN: The first thing they did was to . . . after the oil had gone out of the ship, all that 
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was going to go out, you still had oil floating in there above the water and damaged 
tanks.  You still had oil in undamaged tanks on the ship.  The first effort was to get 
smaller ships with shallower draft alongside—I mean, literally alongside the ship and 
start pumping the oil remaining on board onto those ships.  And I remember actually 
going out there one day—I can't remember if it was one of the Houston/New Orleans 
class vessels or one of the San Francisco class vessels, ‘70s or ‘75s . . . I think those were 
the ships they primarily used because they were a smaller and shallower draft . . .. being 
tied up alongside and taking cargo off.  What a lot of people do not realize is that even 
though they lost about 250,000, 260,000 barrels, they actually got 1,000,000 barrels of oil 
off the Valdez before they moved it.  And, in fact, until it was all pumped out and they 
moved everything they could get off of it out of there, only then did they consider 
actually moving it, getting it off the reef.  And they did that . . . we were using a 
traditional salvage method.  What they did is they flew out there—I could see these sky 
crane helicopters coming out with Ingersoll-Rand compressors, put these big air 
compressors on deck and drilled holes in the deck and had the air coming from the 
compressor going down into the cargo spaces.  And basically what they did was since 
you had a water seal still around the hull, they pumped the tank full of air so that the ship 
would float literally off on the air.  It was compressed air. 
JT: What about the hole? 
BN: The hole is in the bottom and the air is being trapped by the water so it can't 
escape.  You only had to pressure it up to like 2 PSI or something like that for it to 
actually affect the buoyancy of the vessel. 
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JT: And then from there, it was able to sail into San Francisco? 
BN: No, they went to another place in Prince William Sound and they had divers 
working for days cleaning the inside of the ship and getting all the oil out before they 
ever attempted to go to sea.  And it had only been after that they started for San Diego.  
That is another whole story of how they were taking it down there.  
JT: What were some of the options?  I take it that is the final option there, but what 
were some other options on the table as far as what do with the ship? 
BN: Well, before they left Prince William Sound, the idea was to, what we were 
working on at that time and I was involved in that—I was back in Houston—was finding 
a place to get it repaired.  The first option was to go into a repair facility in Portland, 
Oregon, but the requirements for getting it in there, the bonding requirements and all the 
other costs associated with getting in there were just cost prohibitive.  So, they decided 
not to go there.  In the meantime, we began negotiations with NASCO, National Steel 
and Ship Building in San Diego which is a shipyard where the Valdez and the Long 
Beach were built for the repair.  They had sent a group of people to Houston, the same 
people we had negotiated the original building contract with, and I remember, for several 
days including a Saturday and a Sunday, we negotiated a repair contract with them for the 
repair of the vessel.  I think it was about a 30-something million dollar contract.  What 
was interesting though is that given the severity of damage to the ship, they were not 
sure, they were not real sure how they were going to repair it at the time but they actually 
were very successful in their repair efforts and the strategy for repairing the ship worked 
out real well.  But that was the first obstacle, getting that.  So, we then negotiated that 
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contract and that got signed.  So, they were headed to San Diego. 
 The next obstacle which occurred several weeks later—I can't remember the 
timeframe—I think I was out there though in July and August.  This was like several 
months later from March when I arrived off San Diego.  Then, the difficulty became: Is 
the State of California going to allow the ship to go into the shore given the condition that 
it is in?  And that precipitated a whole another round of negotiations at that time with the 
State of California and a number of different agencies of the State of California including 
the Game and Fish people, the Attorney General's office, someone like, I think they call it 
their General Land Office like we do in Texas and also local water quality district down 
in the San Diego area.  And we negotiated with them for two weeks where we really 
reached a . . . actually, after about one week, I think we started to make some progress.  
About the first week, we had to listen to everybody harang about this, that and the other.  
Also, a couple of times during the negotiations in the first week, we had some other 
problems that came up—actually had to fly out to the ship a couple of times on 
helicopter, land out there on the ship.  There were requests by the State of Alaska to 
preserve some of the sections of steel plate on the bottom of the ship.  What had 
happened to the ship while it was in transit from Alaska down to San Diego is that large 
sections of the bottom plating broke loose but they didn't actually break loose from the 
ship, they just were hanging down vertically under the ship, bent down and hanging down 
vertically.  Some of these sections were over 70 feet in length so, I mean, it made the 
draft of the ship kind of like 80, 90 feet with these huge pieces of steel hanging down.  
The ship went to anchor off San Clemente Island outside state territorial waters 3 miles 
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and the water was real deep there and you had divers down into the hull and cutting these 
plates with a torch.  It was extremely dangerous work because when the plates would 
break loose, instead of dropping directly to the bottom in a straight fall, they acted like a 
leaf falling off a tree in the wind and cascaded all kinds of different directions before it 
reached the bottom.  And anyone in the way would have been sliced in half if one of 
these plates would have hit them.  Went out to the ship anticipating . .. . talked to the 
salvage people about whether or not it was practical or possible to save any of this 
material.  And, of course, the salvage master, in a very language which I obviously will 
not use, told us what we could do with those plates or told me to tell the State of Alaska 
what they could do with these plates if they wanted them, that if they wanted them, they 
needed to come get them, that he was not going to risk any of his divers. 
 Anyway, we went back and ended up, actually the State of California talking with 
us there, the State of Alaska people and basically told them we were not going to save the 
plates, that it was too dangerous.  Of course, they were trying to get California to do 
something and the California people basically said, look, it is not our problem.  As long 
as they don't drop them in state waters, we don't really care what they do with them.  
Anyway, that was the decision that was made in consultation with the people back in 
Houston that I was talking to.  But that was a major problem, getting those plates off 
because they had to be cut off before the ship could come in.  And then, we had a whole 
protocol put in place for the ship to enter and what should take place and this kind of 
thing, that and the other. 
 I remember the ship came in on a Sunday morning.  A lot of fanfare.  There were 
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a lot of boats out there—Green Peace and people demonstrating on the water—but really, 
it was uneventful from the time they arrived off the sea buoy and the Coast Guard was on 
the bridge.  There were some people from the State there but the Coast Guard basically 
told everybody on the bridge not to communicate with any of the ship's people or talk to 
the pilot.  "If you have anything to say or ask about anything, you talk directly to me."  
This was the captain of the port.  And the ship came in and went to the dock.  It did not 
go into the graving dock at that time, it just went alongside a dock.  We tied it off at that 
time.  I remember being down on the dock and they were tying up the ship and the tugs 
came in behind it.  There wasn't anybody there to handle the lines of the tugs.  I ended up 
tying those tugs off and handling the lines of the tugs when it came in.  I was doing a 
little double duty that day.  But anyway, that was the day it got in.  I remember going on 
the ship right after it got tied off and we got the gangway down. 
JT: What was the biggest surprise to you out of all of this that had occurred in the first 
couple of months? 
BN: I think, for me, the biggest surprise and actually the thing that was just really 
difficult to deal with was the extreme hostility and really hatred.  It was just unbelievable 
the hostility, of course, not only towards Exxon, but any of us that were involved.  I had 
been with the shipping company 15 years or so before that time and I went to work there 
when I was roughly 30 years old.  I had kind of grown up with these people.  And I knew 
the people on the ships really well because I was out there a lot and worked with them, 
represented them before the Coast Guard and things like that.  I represented the company 
and, of course, their interest at the same time in some way before the Coast Guard.  And 
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to see these people treated like they were drug dealers or common criminals was difficult, 
very difficult, for me to accept and to understand.  And to this day, I still have very strong 
feelings about that.  It is very difficult to see this happen. [End of Tape One] 
[Tape Two, Side One] 
JT: This is an oral history interview with Bob Nicholas, attorney for Exxon during the 
Valdez.  Tape 2, oral history interview by Jason Theriot on November 21, 2006, for 
Center for Public History, University of Houston.  This is Bob Nicholas on OPA ‘90.  So, 
go ahead.  What is your response to that? 
BN: Was the U.S. actually prepared for an oil spill the size of the Exxon Valdez?  I 
think the answer is obviously no—from the documentation you see that comes out after 
the spill and years later and whatever else.   Even at the time, there are a number of things 
I think that point to the fact that the answer would be no.  First of all, I think there had 
never been a spill of that magnitude.  There were larger spills but the spills had not 
occurred in the U.S. nor had they occurred in Europe.  Even the spill involving the Torrey 
Canyon back in 1966 was not this large.  Of course, the ships were not as large either.  
And that, I think, makes the difference.  There was a very large spill of a Shell vessel 
down in the Strait of Magellan.  I can't remember what happened to the ship, if they 
salvaged the ship or not but that was a very large spill, larger than the Exxon Valdez spill, 
but again, it did not occur in the U.S.  Unfortunately, it did occur in an area of very 
pristine environmental area, but it was so far removed from civilization and I doubt if 
there was any clean up or any response at all.  They probably just let nature take care of 
it.  But with the Valdez, in all the planning, all of the spill response planning, was for 
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much smaller spills than the Exxon Valdez spill.  The other thing was you didn't 
have…the level of planning that is required now, that was in place.  I mean, there were 
some resources available but what actually happened was in order to cope with the spill 
of that magnitude, I mean, the Coast Guard . . . actually, it was Exxon, geared up to 
actually handle the volume of the spill, bring it in.  Just mobilizing this massive 
transportation effort to move all the spill response equipment—skimmers, boom, all types 
of spill response equipment to it including people because you had to have a large body 
of resource there to get out there.  I mean, there was nobody . . . Alaska's population is 
small—the population of Valdez—there is hardly anybody there.  The Alaska resources 
that were mobilized were primarily fishing boats that were used to take equipment and 
people out to the response areas.  But yes, definitely this was not a situation where the 
country was prepared.  I think even the Coast Guard commented, if it had to be anybody, 
we were glad it was Exxon because of their vast financial resources and their ability to 
respond even given the magnitude of the spill, to respond in a very large way.  What 
people do not realize is forget the litigation and the lawsuits and everything else—Exxon 
spent about $4 billion up there just on cleanup efforts, $4 billion. 
JT: That came out of Exxon's pocket? 
BN: That is out of their pocket.  They got some of that money back from insurance but 
a fraction, a mere fraction of that.  The most liability insurance a vessel had for pollution 
liability coverage was $400 million, which that goes to pay third party type claims and 
they went through that probably in a few days.  I think there was some excess insurance 
which ended up in some protracted litigation afterwards, which they were able to collect 
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on—they settled with the underwriter on—but the amount of insurance compensation that 
they received was miniscule compared to the amount of money they spent on the cleanup 
efforts.  And then, of course, the cost of . . . just to talk about that a little bit.  When you 
get into litigation—the litigation over the spill is still going on even though it has 
occurred over the past 15 years—the cost of that litigation is just enormous.  I have no 
idea but I am sure the attorneys' fees are well into the millions.  And I was there during 
this period of time and I can speak to this is that, after a major event like this, I do not 
know whether you can quantify the amount of lost man hours.  When you look at, here 
you are trying to run a business and you have to devote a huge number of resources, 
people resources, to responding to all of the discovery claims, discovery issues in the 
lawsuits, producing documents, producing people as witnesses, and it just puts a real 
drain on your company, somebody the size of Exxon because really you were focusing on 
one actual small part of this business—the domestic shipping business or tanker 
transportation—so, it was quite a drain on us as I recall going through that period of time.  
And it was one of these things that never let up.  Anybody that had any kind of grievance 
ever against Exxon or Exxon Shipping Company, they were all coming out of the 
woodwork trying to make some hay or get some money out of the situation.  So, it was 
very difficult.  But I would say that to anyone. 
 I remember I had given a talk in London in 1998 talking about the implementation 
of the International Safety Management Code, ISM code for ships, and what I pointed out 
to everyone there was that after experiencing something like the Exxon Valdez, you 
cannot spend, in my opinion, enough money on prevention and your efforts ought to go 
HHA# 00653  Page 29 of 70 
Interviewee: Nicholas, Bob 
Interview: November 21, 2006, December 4, 2006 
University of Houston  Houston History Archives 
 
29 
towards prevention and training and making sure that you have got a situation where you 
can prevent something like that from every happening.  I have been involved in accident 
investigations for many, many years and you look at there are two airlines in the world, 
Quantas and Southwest, and neither one of those airlines have ever had a crash.  I guess 
that incident where the plane went off the runway in Chicago was the closest event that 
Southwest has ever had like a crash but not really a crash of the aircraft.  I think it goes to 
show people with the right safety environment in place, the right safety system in place, 
you can prevent accidents like that.  There is no question in my mind this one was 
absolutely 100 percent preventable.  You have one person involved in creating an error 
chain and no procedures in place to prevent that error chain from being broken, you are 
going to have an event like the Exxon Valdez.  You are going to have plane crashes, you 
are going to have whatever kinds of . . . ship collisions, whatever, ship grounds, because 
you've got one person up there doing everything and they make a mistake and that 
mistake is not caught by somebody else .. . . that is what happened afterwards.  Exxon 
went into a whole process called “bridge team training” with the idea in mind of having 
more than one person involved in navigation.  And, of course, the Coast Guard 
regulations now require—that was one of the things that came out in OPA 90—now you 
have to have more than one navigation officer—you have to have more than one officer 
on the bridge of the ship when you are in Prince William Sound and maybe in other 
areas.  I can't remember now.  But that is now part of the Coast Guard regulations.   
JT: Let me ask you about some of the legislation that was enacted prior to OPA and I 
have a list on here.  If you are not familiar with them, I have got an actual list of the full 
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names but it is TAPPA, FWPCA, OCSA, and then the Deep Water Ports Act and then 
CERCLA.  These are all the legislations that had been in place.  Briefly go over and 
touch on some of those and explain how these related to the Exxon Valdez, so that we 
can get an idea of just how limited the liability was. 
BN: Well, the first one, TAPPA or TransAlaska Pipeline Authorization Act really did 
not have any particular liability provisions in it.  What it did require is the creation of an 
oil spill liability fund and it placed some financial responsibility requirements on vessel 
owners operating ships in and out of Alaska that would trade to the terminus at Valdez of 
the TransAlaska Pipeline system.  There were not any requirements in that statute for 
double hulls, increased manning requirements, other ship design, criteria, things like that 
that actually had been addressed.  I notice you don't have that in here.  There were a lot of 
things addressed after the Amoco Cadiz incident.  I can't remember when that was, 
probably some time in the 1970s or 1980s [1978].  I guess it was late 1970s.  And there 
were quite a few amendments.  Well, there were amendments at the international level to 
the IMO, International Maritime Organization convention, MARPOL, the Maritime 
Pollution Prevention statute or pollution convention.  In addition, it was probably around 
the time they passed the Ports and Waterways Safety Act which you address later on in 
here and there were amendments to the Tank Vessel Act or Tank Vessel Statute which 
required . . . this is when indirect gas came in so you wouldn't have explosions of ships.  
As ships got larger, there were a series of incidents involving large tankers where they 
would actually explode while they were tank cleaning and what they found out was that 
the tank cleaning equipment and there were little Butterworth machines there—a little 
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round-shaped looking device that has arms on it that rotate and spray hot water on the 
tank walls and they rotate all around and try to get—they have lots of different machines 
in them—in a tank given the size of the tank.  They would actually create a negative 
charge kind of like creating a small thunderstorm in the tank and you would have the 
charge release, the build up of the negative charge, and you would get like a bolt of 
lightning that actually would occur.  And that is where the ignition source came from.  
So, as a way to prevent that, all crude oil tankers were required to install inert gas 
systems and basically most of them installed equipment which took the exhaust gases and 
scrubbed those and cleaned them up and then they would pump those into the cargo 
tanker, on top of the cargo or empty tank so that you would keep the level of oxygen in 
the tank down to a minimum, so you could conduct cargo washing operations and things 
like that.  
 There was a lot . . . I remember after Amoco Cadiz, in this country anyway, there 
was quite a bit of pressure.  There was some pressure anyway on the industry to 
implement double hulls.  Of course, that did not occur at that time.  That came later with 
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.  I don't know if I mentioned this before but I still think 
double hulls have yet to . . . our experience of double hulls—they are new, they do 
prevent spills when you had low impact groundings and things like that but there are 
other problems with double hulls that will start to… we will see those at some time later 
as these ships get older. 
 The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, FWPCA, often referred to as the Clean 
Water Act, again, this was a liability statute which created, actually before Valdez, 
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permitted recovery of liability for oil spill damages by the federal government.  
Primarily, it didn't have a cause for action for private damages.  The OPA 90 changed 
that.  There were proof of financial responsibility requirements under the Act.  It also 
requires reporting the spill and the reporting requirements have remained the same.  
Basically, if a spill, and this involves persistent oil which is crude oil, lube oil, anything 
that leaves a sheen on the water, if you see a sheen, that is a reportable quantity as 
defined in the regulations.  That came out the regulations.  That was way back in the ‘70s.  
That is a reportable quantity.  And it is a felony not to report, but if you report, then you 
cannot be charged criminally under that statute.  There were criminal penalties but not to 
the extent that they are now under OPA.  The amendments to Clean Water Act or Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act under OPA 90 increased the severity of the civil as well as 
the criminal penalties.   
JT: What about CERCLA? 
BN: Oh, CERCLA, the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Compensation 
Liability Act.  CERCLA is primarily aimed at . . . well, it has two parts to it and it really 
doesn't cover persistent oil.  It is more if you looked at parts of CERCLA that address 
requirements regarding the handling of hazardous waste and transportation of hazardous 
substances.  And there is a whole list of hazardous substances listed by the EPA.  And 
you look at that list if you are moving those, hauling those and a lot of them are 
chemicals like all the polypropylenes and styrofoam and stuff like that.  And this statute, 
if you have a spill of any of the items that are listed there, the regulation will tell you 
what the report of quantity is.  It is quite different than oil.  In some cases, it is pounds—
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how many pounds you spilled or gallons or things like that.  You have to maybe have 
some way of determining whether or not you even have a reportable spill.  Some of this 
stuff is very difficult, if not impossible, to clean up.  If you have a ship that is hauling 
CERCLA cargo and you have an oil spill . . . a number of years ago, there was an attempt 
to have response plans for these vessels and that never, for some reason, came about.  So, 
we don't have response planning requirements for certain cargos other than oil cargos 
there.  You still have to respond but you may not have to have a specific response plan 
back in place like you do for oil.  And actually, I have not kept up with that real well but I 
don't think they ever got around to implementing the response plan requirements for the 
CERCLA-type cargos. 
JT: So, with this list here, it appears that, at least the federal government was trying to 
make some attempts at prevention. 
BN: Yes. 
JT: But the Valdez incident was certainly much larger than anyone had anticipated. 
BN: Yes. 
JT: You mentioned earlier the $400 million insurance liability.   Outside of that and 
outside of the $5 billion they eventually paid out, what was the Valdez technically 
lawfully liable to pay in that incident? 
BN: Well, its proof of financial responsibility, I think, under TransAlaska Pipeline 
Authorization Act and I am telling you this is all from memory, but I believe the max was 
$20 million, was the max. 
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JT: So, technically speaking, as the books had it . . .  
BN: There was a different proof of financial responsibility requirements.  It seemed 
like the limits were lower at that time.  But it was quite a bit less.  It wasn't $400 million.  
$400 million was the max insurance they had.  Now, that is just insurance.  That did not 
limit their liability.  Their liability was unlimited under state law and under just plain old 
ordinary common law negligence.  But yes, those limits, of course, were increased 
substantially afterwards, both through state legislation and federal legislation.  In fact, the 
state requirements in Alaska are such that only major oil companies can meet the proof of 
financial responsibility requirements.  You or I could never charter a ship to go to Alaska 
and pick up a cargo of ANS crude that we bought from somebody. The financial 
responsibility requirements are massive plus the plan requirements and that kind of thing.  
In fact, there was even some antitrust litigation at one time because of that stuff, but it all 
went away.   
JT: Well, let's talk about the real issue here, OPA 90, Oil Pollution Act of 1990.  How 
did OPA differ from the aforementioned laws and why had Congress waited so long to 
pass effective legislation? 
BN: Again, I think the magnitude of the spill was the driving force behind the Oil 
Pollution Act of 90 and amendments.  And I say "amendments" . . . the Oil Pollution Act 
of 1990, if you look at it as a series of amendments to a whole bunch of existing statutory 
provisions that were already in effect.  The main liability provisions, the proof of 
financial responsibility requirements and the limits of liability, those are all amendments 
to the Clean Water Act or Federal Water Pollution Control Act.  The amendments dealing 
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with double hulls with manning and work hours requirements, drug testing and all those 
things, those are amendments to existing Coast Guard statutes and regulations that deal 
with tank vessels specifically and with the manning statutes that the Coast Guard 
oversees, with the licensing requirements and licensing statutes that the Coast Guard 
oversees for the licensing of American merchant mariners, all of that was statutory 
amendments to existing legislation.  There was part of the Act consolidated—I think we 
talked about this before in general—consolidated all of oil spill liability funds in 
existence at the time.  The TransAlaska Pipeline Authorization Act as well as the Deep 
Water Ports Act Fund, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Fund and whatever else 
was there got all consolidated in this one Oil Pollution Liability Fund, federal fund.  That 
was probably a good idea to consolidate all those and not have different ones implying in 
different places.  It made a lot of sense probably and the Coast Guard oversees the 
administration of that particular fund. 
JT: But if you look at it, and the federal government is obviously historically guilty of 
this, more of a reactive response versus a proactive. And if you look at hurricanes, natural 
disasters, have things changed in your opinion as far as maritime law and that type of 
industry?  Has that sort of changed with the massive Valdez style oil spills?  Has the 
government been practicing more proactive motions? 
BN: I don't think so.  I think it is reactive and it is all political.  To give you some 
examples:  We have the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, we have the No Limits of Liability 
provision in there although there are limits of liability highlighted in the statute which 
everybody thinks everybody will go blow right through and not really pay any attention 
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to if you have a spill.  The limits of liability provision say you can limit your liability up 
to the limits set out in the statute.  So many dollars per gross ton.  I think after the 
incident of the ship about the size of Valdez, it would be about $100 million or whatever 
it is but people carried up to $1 billion insurance now.  But you cannot benefit from the 
ship owner's limitation, 1851 Ship Owners Limitation of Liability Act.  That has gone 
away.  And if you can enforce open limits of liability, whatever they are and they were to 
stand, if they were to be upheld, they would stand in place and still looking at quite a bit 
of money.  There is a whole different oil spill liability regime at the international level 
using the Civil of Liability and Fund Convention and the Civil Liability Convention 
imposes which is insured through the vessel's underwriter, pollution carrier, that was 
rejected as not being adequate.  And then, the fund convention, the United States has 
never ratified that convention.  The fund convention places another layer of funding on 
top of the vessel owner's requirements for insurance with the creation of international 
funds and if you are a signatory to the fund, based upon your import of oil, that is how 
much money—some formula there—you pay into the fund.  Well, after the United States 
not being a signatory to one of those conventions, the United States could not recover a 
dime from the fund and it is still that way.  We still have not ratified that convention.  In 
the meantime, the rest of the world after the Erica and Prestige vessel accidents in Europe 
have increased liability limits, have increased requirements for double hulls, even more 
so with an implementation plan going into effect more rapidly than our own in Europe 
and here we are, sitting here with our own limitation limits which have absolutely 
nothing to do with the international conventions.  And if there is a weakness in OPA 90, 
I'll tell you what it is, with respect to the limitation of liability.  
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 The vessels that call into U.S. that bring most of the crude oil into the U.S., with 
the exception of a few of the ships that move Alaskan oils to the lower 48, the vast 
majority of those ships are foreign owned and being foreign owned, if the owner of those 
vessels has no assets in the United States and does not reside in the United States, and has 
a Valdez-type event, and with a space . . . say you spill 11 million gallons or you spill 20 
million gallons, that ship owner's limitation of liability is going to be de facto.  You are 
not going to have unlimited liability against this vessel owner.  Actually, technically, the 
only thing he has to expose is his limits of liability under the act.  He may be exposing his 
billion dollars worth of insurance or whatever it is the vessel owner carries but in order 
for that insurance to be exposed, the vessel owner would have to be . . . there would have 
to be a judicial finding that the limits of liability didn't apply.  But as the spill resulted 
from, as the statute points out, some violation of regulation and there is some criteria in 
there in the statute which sets out how you can break limitations or go through 
limitations, but whatever it is, that vessel owner, if you can't reach him here in the United 
States, can't get your personal jurisdiction over him, you are only going to get jurisdiction 
over the ship through an admiralty process called Inroom Jurisdiction, which gives you 
actual jurisdiction over the property of the vessel itself and not the owner.  And if the 
owner never appears, you can't get personal service on the owner, that is all you are going 
to get and that is all that is going to happen.  You know, there is not going to be these 
billions of dollars paid out by some oil company.  In states that have cargo owner 
liability, you may be able to collect some money from . . . probably the majority of the 
money will come from a cargo owner but not from the ship owner. 
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JT: Let's give an example.  If it is coming from Venezuela, the ship is foreign owned, 
it is Venezuelan government owned cargo . . . 
BN: That further complicates it.  You've got a question of the application.  There is 
also another federal statute called the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act which does not 
allow you to sue foreign governments in U.S. courts because of the fact that they are a 
foreign sovereign, just as you cannot sue the federal government except under limited . . . 
you can't sue any government agency or entity unless they have, by statute, waived 
immunity in some way, shape or form so that you've got the question of whether or not 
that would be applicable.  So, that would be very complicated.  It is not going to be a fun, 
free-for-all after Valdez where you are going to find . . . and, again, Texas and Louisiana, 
neither Texas or Louisiana has cargo in their liability.  The only liability that is going to 
be on the vessel or on the spilling party. 
JT: All they would get essentially is the property value of the busted ship? 
BN: They'll get the insurance.  They'll get the billion dollars or whatever . . . 
JT: Whatever the maximum that he has. 
BN: Yes, whatever the max is. 
JT: Does he have to carry a billion? 
BN: No.  Whatever the OPA 90 limits are.  He is carrying insurance over and above 
those limits but then the underwriter, first of all, is going to try to enforce those limits.  
The ship owner is going to have to do what the underwriter says in those cases because 
the way the policy is written, P&I insurance basically is protection and indemnity and it 
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is indemnity insurance.  The vessel owner is really on the hook first and it is supposed to 
pay before it can be paid.  Now, most of the time, the underwriter goes on and pays but it 
only pays . . . anyway, the underwriter will only pay out money for which the insured is 
legally liable to pay as a result of his liability under statutory, common law, whatever.  
And that is all they are going to pay.  So, until a court were to say, O.K., we are . . .  
[Tape Two, Side Two] 
JT: Explain to me what is a P&I, what role they play in such an incident? 
BN: Well, P&I stands for protection and indemnity and these are associations that are 
usually made up . . . the members of the P&I club are the vessel owners and the club is 
managed by some management group.  There is an American P&I Club, I guess.  There 
was, anyway.  The other major ones are in Europe:  The U.K. Club, the Britannia Club, 
the Scold is a Swedish club.  Those are just some of the ones I can think of off the top of 
my head.  They are the underwriters.  It is a little bit different because the insurance is 
different but the P&I club handles the third party liability for the vessel owner.  It is kind 
of like your liability insurance for your car.  You get in an automobile accident, you are 
at fault and your liability underwriter comes in and protects you and provides counsel.  If 
you get sued, they represent you.  That kind of thing.  That is what a P&I club does.  
Now, there are specific rules that the club has just like in your policy.  And the premiums 
are based on the amount of the coverage.  Now, I know this:  most P&I clubs in the past 
after Valdez, especially after the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, if you had a 
ship trading to the U.S., you paid the surcharge.  In other words, you paid more money 
coming to the U.S. than you did going to other countries in the world because of the 
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liability limits not only at the federal but at the state level in a lot of cases.  So, as far as I 
know, I guess those charges are still in effect, although my guess is that Europe has 
gotten very expensive now, too, following those two major tanker accidents over there in 
the late 1990s. 
JT: Well, if you look at all of the actors in this story—the ship owner, the companies, 
the natural resources involved, the federal government—all the major actors in this story, 
who benefitted and who lost from OPA 90? 
BN: Oh, that is a tough question.   
JT: First of all, let's start with who benefitted from OPA 90? 
BN: People that were in a salvage business and spill contractors, people like that.  If 
those businesses weren't there, they sprang up afterwards.  Existing spill response 
contractors probably were able to expand their business as a result of the specific 
requirements because one of the major changes that OPA 90 required with respect to 
vessels is the requirement for . . . and I think that is one of your questions in here about 
contingency plans, but each ship has to have its own spill response plan in order to trade 
to the U.S.  Texas and Louisiana also have state requirements for spill response plans, 
although if you meet the federal, you cover the state.  In filling out your form to go to the 
Coast Guard when you are making up your plan, you can't just indicate what you are 
going to do.  You also have to have listed in there the names of the contractors you call in 
the event you have a spill in the Port of Houston or the Port of Galveston or Texas City.  I 
mean, you have this huge area here.  Who are you going to call?  Who is going to 
respond?  What kind of resources do they have?  That kind of thing.  So, you have to set 
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those out specifically.  So, you have to enter into those contracts in advance.  So, those 
people are already signed up and ready to go in case you have a spill and you call them 
up and your on-scene coordinator shows up and says, O.K. . . . prior to that, somebody 
calls and said, go out there, this is where we are at, this is what you've got to do . . . 
estimate the kinds of resources needed and that kind of thing.  So, definitely people like 
that, I think.  You know, you look at probably people in manufacturing, oil boom, oil 
spill response equipment—the requirements for huge stockpiles of that stuff up at Valdez 
or Alaska.  Oil spill clean up barge is another equipment that they have to have up in 
Prince William Sound.  Of course, you know, a lot of that was a one-shot deal.  If you 
know stuff doesn't get used unless it is something that deteriorates over a period of time 
and it has got to be replaced, you know, there is not going to be a continued great demand 
for that. 
JT: I guess a ship building company would have had some business with the double 
hulls? 
BN: Well, that was the hope of the U.S. ship building industry, which is almost 
nonexistent.  The only shipyards left . . . there are a few yards left and they build mainly 
vessels for the military, the Navy.  But that was thought to be the savior of the American 
yards—that there was going to be this great demand for double hulled vessels to replace 
the aging U.S. Flag tanker fleet.  Well, that has not occurred.  The reason it hasn't is 
because actually a lot of that was actually started . . . the demand for that type of shipping 
was already on the decline even before Valdez.  There used to be a huge number of ships 
trading between Gulf Coast and the East Coast north of Cape Hateras, New York/Boston 
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area, Maine, product trade:  fuel oil, gasoline, motor gasoline, things like that.  Well, 
since the late 1950s, 1960s, some time in the 1960s, I guess, you had pipelines going in 
so most of that product goes up there by pipelines.  It is a lot more efficient way to move 
it and a lot less expensive way to move that volume product.  So, that cut way back on 
the demand for American flag ships to move that product.  That product had to go in 
American flag ships because that is part of the U.S. Coastwise trade.  By statute, it has to 
be American built, American flag, American crude vessels, Jones Act vessels.  Same way 
with Alaska trade.  Even though it is noncontiguous U.S. trade, it still has to use the Jones 
Act ships.  But with the exception of the Jones Act Trade for Alaskan oil, the rest of the 
stuff is almost dying.  There are a few ships that are still plotting the waters with their 
American flag.  So, with respect to large tankers, no, not much help.  The smaller you are 
to build barges, on the other hand, probably have had and are still getting a chance to 
build although the industry was already, even before OPA 90, moving towards double 
hulled barges in the inland waterways.  It makes a lot of sense.  Those things get banged 
together all the time and the steel they are built of, it is not near the thickness and the 
weight that you find in a ship.  It doesn't need to be.  But it is not that hard to puncture 
one, especially if you are banging them up together all the time in tows.  But that didn't 
happen there in the ship building industry.  Most of the double hulled ships coming to 
this country now that are moving crude are foreign and bringing a crew from foreign 
countries. 
JT: Well, in theory, also those who benefitted would be local communities, the 
natural environments of a potential spill which, because of the response plans that are in 
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place or the contingency, etc. . . . 
BN: Oh, yes, if you want to measure . . . 
JT: . . . you need to be able to avoid the massive Valdez spill. 
BN: Oh, yes.  I think the other thing that has happened, too, is there have been a lot of 
technological developments that occurred afterwards where people have developed better 
dispersants.  There are some products now that have been used in Galveston Bay and 
what is great about it . . . they spray this material which consists of bacteria, I guess is 
what it is or microbes or whatever it is that actually eat the oil and what is good about 
that . . . if you've got a spill in a marsh area, you don't have to go in there and really 
disrupt the habitat.  You can go around in boats and spray this stuff.  I've seen them do it 
at the upper parts of Galveston Bay and they just run along the shore line and spray this 
stuff all the way up to the tide line.  And you come back in a few . . . and it works really 
well down there.  It works better in warmer water.  And you go back on a few months, 
you can't tell that there was ever any oil in there.  It is amazing how well that stuff works.  
So, there are technological developments, I think along those lines. 
 I think the big thing though is with . . . the emphasis is on pollution.  Given the 
potential for liability of the massive costs involved, if you are an American Flag operator, 
as I said before, basically, you bet your company every time you put a vessel to sea 
because of the potential cost involved in a massive spill, the clean up cost efforts and 
liability.  So, whatever efforts you can direct towards prevention . . . and the number of 
spills is way, way down.  It doesn't mean that something is not likely to happen sooner or 
later because there are people that always like to cut corners.  That has always been . . .  
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 You know, having been connected, I'll make this comment.  Having been 
connected with the tanker shipping business for more years than I would like to 
remember now—well over 30 years—and I think this is probably true of shipping in 
general: people who ship don't like to pay a lot of money for the transportation.  I always 
said that unless you've got OPA 90s and European legislation in effect and domestic 
legislation in effect that mandates only double hulled ships coming to your country, 
whatever the requirements are, I could go out in the world and there are people I still 
would bet are doing this—collect up the bottom of the barrel tonnage that is available, 
ships that long since should have been scrapped and find substandard crews and operate 
them and make money.  And the reason you make money is because there is always 
somebody willing to pay for the cheaper transportation.  They don't want to pay for the 
double.  People don't want to buy double protection.  They don't care.  They want the 
cheapest way you can get it and I think that is an unfortunate thing.  And the only way 
you can get around that is you've got to have governments coming to pass legislation so 
there is a level playing field and this is the standard.  You've got to raise that standard 
high enough up so that if it is double hulls you want or whatever protection you want in 
the operation of equipment that is going to move oil by sea, you are going to have to 
legislate it. 
 Even the international conventions . . . I mentioned earlier the ISM code, 
International Ship Management Code or Safety Management Code . . .. it was hailed as, 
this is directed at prevention.  It is really directed at people.  I thought, yes, this is a good 
idea but the people that will implement this will try and cheat and they do, and they go 
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out and they get somebody to certify that they have an ISM or safety management system 
in place on their ship and that they have a shore side safety management system in place 
and I have seen these.  And this requires that you do right because I have been involved 
in setting these up.  It requires you educate your people, that you train your people in 
what you want them to do.  If you have to have a system in place for reporting not only 
accidents but near misses and if you have a near miss or an accident, you need to have in 
place a system which conducts an investigation and a root cause analysis or some type of 
analysis of the casualty or near miss, and makes recommendations for if there are any 
gaps or holes in your procedures or things like that, that changes be made and 
implemented.  A very complex process.  I don't see that happening. 
JT: The U.S. is not assignee of this charter? 
BN: Oh, yes. We are.  Most of the people that operate in the U.S. are operating under 
ISM.  But, you know, there are still people that cheat under that.  I know that the manuals 
I have seen and some things I have reviewed since I have been here, there seems to be a 
boiler plate type of manual that some of these . . . actually, the P&I clubs use these.  So, 
you go out and you get these and put them on your ship and get some certifying agency, 
classification society or whatever certify that you are ISM compliant.  What is interesting 
though that, since most of the shipping coming from the U.S. now is foreign flag, Coast 
Guard and even the European countries have implemented what they call a port state 
enforcement program.  Under port state enforcement, the Coast Guard will board you.  
They will look at . . . in fact, we talked about the NVIC, the Navigation Vessel Inspection 
Circulars—a whole bunch of these out there are published by the Coast Guard which deal 
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with the question of port state enforcement of ISM.  And they will board you.  And their 
policy is to first of all check your certificates and make sure you got your certificates and 
that they are not out of date and check all the paper work first but then, as they are going 
around there looking at the ship, if the way the ship is being operated, say it is at the dock 
just charging cargo or whatever, the general condition of the ship would lead them to 
believe you might have the paper but we don't see any real evidence of a safety 
management system in place, they can call you to task on that right there on the spot.  
And they have done so.  In fact, you go to the port state enforcement web site and you 
will find that there are certain vessels that have been barred or asked to depart, not come 
back until all these items are fixed or you have this in place or whatever. 
JT: And this is OPA 90? 
BN: This is at the international level.  This is not really part of OPA 90.  I think 
though, it doesn't surprise me though that the international maritime community went in 
this direction.  The OPA 90, I think, was just the opening round of domestic legislation 
and it came out in the U.S. that said, hey, you guys have got low grades of standard here.  
We can't have this kind of risk involved and not up the standards here for international 
shipping. 
And I think that obviously impacted . . . you know, because the IMO is made up 
of countries.  Our representative IMO is the Coast Guard because they enforce all these 
types of laws.  So, that is where this stuff gets started, and other countries, you know.  
One of the other things that came out of that . . . we have specific work hours 
requirements for people on tankers.  That is before ISM came into effect, you had the 
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STCW convention come into effect—Standards of Trading, Watchkeeping and 
Certification or Certification and Watchkeeping—whatever it was.  But STCW is aimed 
at having a certain level of training for seagoing personnel.  It does not really address 
work hours but it does require rest periods.  That is still a major issue.  I think that is the 
major issue confronting the ship industry today and that is you work people too long.  
They want to reduce the manning on the ships down to less than 20 people and you've got 
people that work just ungodly hours on these ships, on these foreign flag ships, because 
there were no restrictions on work hours specifically.  And, as under OPA 90, we had 
specific—with respect to tankers, there are absolute specific—work hour requirements.  
You can't work but so many hours within a 24 hour or 72 hour period or whatever it is 
that is set out there.  Those are steps in the right direction but again, there is always a way 
to cheat and there is always a way to get around.  And as long as you've got the shipper 
out there  who wants to pay the least amount for freight, that is going to happen.  That is 
the tragedy of it.  I mean, the greed is live and well as we all know. 
JT: Well, let's move on to some local considerations with respect to the Port of 
Houston, the Port of Galveston and the Houston Ship Channel, the areas within this 
region.  Let's take OPA 90, juxtapose it against the Port of Houston and let's look at some 
probable impacts, good or bad, from OPA 90.  Generally speaking, how has OPA 90 
impacted the Port of Houston? 
BN: You know, that is kind of hard to tell.  Again, I am giving you my particular point 
of view.  I think, again, the spill contractor business is probably good here because 
probably . . . this has become a larger and larger container port, but on the other hand, 
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probably the majority of ships that trade in and out of here are tank vessels of some kind, 
product tankers, crude ships, chemical and specialty tankers.  You know, there is a lot of 
that down there, a tremendous number of barges and tow boats moving barges, petroleum 
barges primarily.  I say, primarily, probably the majority of stuff that moves in and out of 
here.  I don't think that there has been any reduction probably in the number of ships that 
call here.  The oil industry, chemical industry, petrochemical industry is huge in this area 
and there are just a huge number of ships trading in and out of here.  Now, what I have 
seen and again, this is not necessarily related to OPA 90 . . . the majority of the ships that 
come in here now are . . .. I say majority, like probably 98 percent of them, that trade in 
and out of here, are foreign flag.  They are not American.  Again, the American flag fleet 
or tanker fleet, there just hasn't been a demand for that coastwise trade anymore because 
of pipelines and various things.  And so, you don't have those ships.  But even with the 
foreign flags coming in, a lot of those ships are new ships.  The double hull requirements 
have forced the newer tonnage to come . . . that was, I think, one of the real benefits was 
as the phase out period came into play and the other requirements for double hull just the 
way that section of law was written, the United States got the benefit of all the new ships 
because of the double hull requirement.  So, as the double hulls were being produced, 
they were slotted into the U.S. trade.  Not only ships coming directly into port but also for 
ships that were lightering offshore, the lightering vessels, as well as the ships to be 
lightered coming out there.  Well, don't quote me on that.  That one, I am not sure about.  
Anyway, the impact was the majority of tankers that started coming to the U.S., you 
know, have been increasingly more and more and more double hulls.  And so, I think that 
was a real benefit to the port in the area because obviously with the double hulls, I think 
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you've got, especially in our area . . . unless you have a major ship collision here and I am 
talking about high speed ship collision can penetrate through the double hull space, shell 
plate in the tank inside between the double hull void, you are not going to spill any oil.  
And I will tell you one thing, you are not going to spill any oil running the ship in the 
ground in the Houston Ship Channel or anywhere around in Galveston or wherever.  The 
bottom here is like it is everywhere else: mud.  No rocks.  Now, I guess you could rip one 
open if you hit a pipeline or something like that but again, you'd probably only puncture 
the outer hull, shell.  So, it is a rare case.  So, I think the provision for this port, no rocks 
and no major obstacles and things like that, is probably pretty good.  Of course, you can 
always run into a platform out in the Gulf.  That hasn't happened in a long time.  
Probably the navigation now with the GPS has also improved greatly because I had a 
case many, many years ago involving a ship that hit a platform and caught on fire.  Just a 
horrendous . . . not much pollution.  The tanks that were ruptured burned and it was 
mainly a sad event because I think it killed 20 people, burned up or something like that.   
There were quite a few people that died.  
JT: Well, you mentioned before that an American ship owner has to gamble with his 
entire company every time he goes out.  What are some of the other impacts of the 
increased liability in the insurance hikes?  And some of the other legislations.  How has 
that impacted this industry down here? 
BN: O.K., but one of the things I ought to mention though in connection with the other 
one, too, is in the towing industry, the barges have been . . . in fact, this has been 
happening in the shipping industry in general.  There have been these huge consolidations 
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that have taken place and I don't know if you can directly attribute those to OPA 90.  
Probably, in some ways, that has influenced it because of the increased cost involved in 
operations because of insurance and it kind of spills over into the next question but you 
are seeing that in the barge industry.  I mean, there used to be Hollywood Marine and 
Kirby [Marine], local companies.  And now, Hollywood was absorbed by Kirby and that 
company has become quite a bit larger.  In fact, it has bought other companies, too.  I 
think Hollywood and that merger was not only there between those two. I think Kirby has 
also acquired other smaller operators.  And some other small companies have gone out of 
business.  That may be related also to the increased cost and operation in insurance. 
 Also, it could be attributable to if they had substandard equipment.  The other 
thing is the cost of having to convert to double hulls could have been a factor for some of 
the small barge operators because, you know, after some point in time, you could no 
longer use . . . especially if you had an older fleet, those older barges would have gone 
first.  I know there have been a couple of small companies or some small companies that 
have basically gone out of business or they sold their other equipment to somebody else.  
So, obviously, I think insurance cost is a factor.  It has gone up exponentially by huge 
amounts following Valdez and costs a lot more.  Of course, that cost gets passed back to 
the consumer who buys the oil.  And eventually, you pay for that at the pumps in one 
way, shape or form, although, again, that is a supply-demand issue.  But, you know, 
transportation of oil to move the oil, the transportation costs are still pretty low.  You are 
moving big enough ships but . . . anyway, did that pretty much answer that? That is at 
least my view of it anyway. 
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JT: Yes, it is sort of a post-OPA liability reality and these realities today are 
completely different than 15 years ago. 
BN: Oh, no question about it.  And if you get out of here and you go to places like 
California, it is even worse because the state legislation there has . . . in fact, the whole 
West Coast, the people out there have just . . . the State of Washington, probably the 
worst.  They have imposed all kinds of local requirements.  For example, they have all 
kinds of rules for laying debunkering operations or refueling operations for ships and 
rules.  They have some of their own rules regarding the cargo transfer operations and 
things like that.  And liability wise, they all have cargo or liability imposed UGA liability 
burdens on anybody shipping oil or owning oil.  That was that the legislatures out there 
wanted to do. 
JT: It just makes it more expensive to function as a business. 
BN: Yes, and if you go to the West Coast and look at the price of the gasoline out 
there, their taxes on gasoline or petroleum products are much, much higher than they are 
here.  But, you know . . . 
JT: Like you said, it would be difficult for you and me to go into that type of 
business. 
BN: Oh, it would just be impossible [laughing].  It would be impossible nowadays 
without having some contract with a major oil company, depending on where you are 
going to move the oil. 
JT: All right.  Well, let's talk about traffic and safety.  The PWS of ‘72 advanced the 
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safety of traffic control in some of our ports to some degree.  How did OPA 90 transcend 
that previous law for more efficient, safe traffic control along the Houston Ship Channel? 
BN: I don't know that OPA 90 did much to change the local VTS.  What is interesting 
is that there is a VTS or vessel traffic system in place in Prince William Sound, and 
before the Valdez left the traffic separation lane to try to get around the ice, they did so 
with the permission of the vessel traffic system.  What I found interesting though is in the 
old days . . . I talked to people up there—I actually went down to the vessel traffic center 
and the operator that was on duty at the time, by the way, tested positive for marijuana 
and he claimed he could not see the Valdez on the radar any longer, which is not true 
because I could see it when it was on the reef.  All you had to do was change the scale, go 
out a little further and it showed up.  But in the old days, some of the captains told me 
that if you did anything like if you just got out to get a little close to getting over the edge 
of the zone, got out of the lane, you were still probably in safe water, that the VTS system 
up there was much more proactive and they would call you down, they would radio you 
and would say, hey, you'd better get over, you are doing this, that and the other.  I always 
said this, after 10 months of being up there looking at everything including the people 
operating the ships and the people operating the VTS, they had been doing this now for a 
long time and there was just a lot of apathy that people had gotten too lax and not paid 
enough attention to what they were doing anymore.  And a lot of that crept in the system, 
but in Houston, I noticed because I was here prior to the time . . . I was working for 
Exxon then doing all their marine casualty work . . . prior to the time of the instillation of 
the Houston Galveston Traffic Vessel System, a lot more . . . of course, Exxon also had a 
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lot . . . [End of tape] 
[Tape Three, Side One] 
JT: This is an oral history interview with Bob Nicholas on December 4, 2006.  This is 
tape 3.  Bob Nicholas, Exxon Valdez and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 by Jason Theriot.  
Some of the safety measure that are put in place with VTS, with OPA 90 standards 
certainly would make the traffic in Houston, the very congested traffic in Houston, 
somewhat more safer, so much more efficient.  As you know, the Houston Ship Channel 
is, by far, the most unique ship channel probably in the country and maybe in the world 
because of its history, because of its size and its depth and its length, etc.  One harbor tug 
operator refers to the business on the channel as a “contact sport.”  You have mentioned 
before about “Texas chicken.”  So what is Texas chicken and what do you know of its 
history and influence on our nation's waterways? 
BN: Of course, the Texas Chicken Rule refers to the method by which large, deep draft 
vessels pass each other in the Houston Ship Channel.  And I guess the rule is still in 
effect even though in the last few years, the Channel, from Bolivar all the way up to 
Morgan’s Point—that is in the open bay part of the channel—has been widened from a 
width of 400 feet to 600 feet. It increased the width from a couple of hundred feet.  I 
believe that is it.  It may be different but I think that is what they've gone to.  From the 
entrance channel up to Bolivar, it was always 600 feet.  I thought they discontinued that 
up.  But basically, the passing rule allowed vessels, under the control of the pilots 
normally, to actually kind of hit directly towards each other which is not hard to do when 
you've got a channel that is only 400 feet wide.  It looks like you are doing that anyway.  
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And then, when they are so many feet apart, of course, the pilots make that judgment, 
they turn to the right, both vessels turned to the right, make a slight turn over to the right.  
Not a far right turn but just move to the right.  And then, the bough wakes as the vessels 
actually approach each other.  The bough wakes, the water being pushed to the side by 
the bough and displacement of the ship, pushes the ships apart.  Keeps them from hitting 
each other.  Anyway, that rule goes back to established practice that was judicially 
recognized by the federal court here in Houston and also by the Court of Appeals in a 
collision case by an Esso ship and an Italian naval vessel in the mid-1920s.  So, it has 
been around a long, long time and it has judicial acceptance as a customary rule, in 
recognizing the maritime law as a customary rule.  But anyway, that is the words of the 
rule.  I think that the widening of the Channel all the way from Bolivar to Morgan's Point 
has probably done a lot to increase the safety of the channel.  The newer ships, I mean, 
you still . . . and, of course, it was not only widened but it was deepened . . . but you are 
still somewhat size limited.  I think the controlling depth now, I am not sure, is 40 feet.  It 
used to be 38 or 39 or 40.  And so, you've got a cushion under that of . . . if you run 
through there with a depth sider . . . I know I do on a sailboat . . . I think it shows 45 feet 
but I think the controlling depth is 40.  But if you get 18 knots, 20 knots, 30 knot gust of 
wind out of the north over a sustained period of time, I guarantee a lot of that water in 
that bay is out in that Gulf and you have to change your arrival draft because of that.  You 
lose a lot of that cushion.  The VTS combined with the deepening and widening of the 
Channel I think has really brought the port here up to date in a lot of ways and I am glad 
to see that happen. 
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JT: Let's do this:  Let's walk through a Valdez-style disaster in the Galveston Bay.  
Let's say, in the Intercoastal byway where you've got opportunity to go several different 
directions, you could have a major collision at a fast pace and you could have, let's say, a 
puncture of a double hull or some type of disaster where you have a massive oil spill or 
maybe a pipeline burst or what have you.  Explain to me how OPA 90 immediately goes 
into effect with respect to Galveston area.  We are talking about removal costs, natural 
resource loss, damage assessment, liabilities, all these that would be associated with this 
kind of accident. 
BN: Yes, of course, what further complicates it is any time you have any kind of major 
oil spill, I think I may have mentioned this to you some time ago, but that area, that scene 
of the vessel or vessels involved, that merely becomes a crime scene now, which is 
unfortunate.  But regardless of whether the vessel is an American flag or foreign flag, the 
tanker, for example . . . and, in fact, let's say it is a collision between a tanker and a tow 
and there are petroleum barges on the tow, the owner of the vessel must immediately 
notify the Coast Guard that there is oil in the water that spilled.  The tow boat owner 
probably ought to do the same if the barge is ruptured and he is spilling oil out of the 
barge.  And just assume the worst.  We've got a bad spill.  The vessel owner needs to call 
the Coast Guard, notify them they've got a spill.  As soon as they get off the phone with 
him, they need to call to do whatever they need to do to activate the response plan if 
they've got oil coming out of that ship, that is required by law.  Within so many hours, 
they probably will have their field representative on site there, the person on charge.  And 
the same way for the tow.  It is a petroleum barge and it is ruptured and it is leaking the 
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oil into the water; they are going to have to do the same thing.  The response contractors, 
of course, would be out on the scene.  The Coast Guard more than likely would close the 
Ship Channel as well as the ICW if the collision occurred at that intersection.  I think we 
mentioned that they would close the channels.  Of course, the Coast Guard would be on 
the scene.  Now, more than likely, given the fact that this has security implications 
because you are closing the Channel, I would not be surprised if the FBI doesn't show up 
either.  This will complicate the investigation, of course, by counsel for the vessels 
involved that more than likely won't be allowed on.  The attorneys won't be allowed out 
there and there will be a claim, if you try to get on, obstructing justice and all that good 
stuff.  But anyway, assuming that aside from all those issues related to the liability, now 
it is not going to matter which vessel is found to be at fault with respect to claims for 
liability.  There may be some division of whoever spilled the most oil, whoever's oil did 
the most damage.  But the spillers, if it comes out of your vessel, you are liable for the 
consequences of the spill.  The liability is strict, it is without fault.  If there is a battle, it 
may be between the two underwriters for the vessel and for the barge, the barge owner or 
tug boat operator.  But they will have to sort that out later on.  They would have to 
respond in liability to any third parties who have been damaged as a result of the spill.  
 Now, direct results of the spill.  This does not include demurrage claims, for 
example, for the closure of the Ship Channel.  If you happened to have a ship sitting out 
there and I have it chartered and I am waiting for it to come in and it can't come in and it 
starts charging me demurrage, the delay cost, I can't collect those because I don't have 
any physical damage directly related to the spill.  I only have monetary damage.  Now, on 
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the other hand though, if you were a bay shrimper and you were shrimping for a living, 
livelihood there and the season was open and you couldn't bay shrimp as a result of the 
spill, even though you don't have physical damage to your boat or whatever else, a person 
who relies upon the use of the natural resource for livelihood can collect damages.  That 
is the difference between the two.  So, those parties would be liable.  The cruise ship 
owners, unfortunately with delays in not being able to bring the ships in or sail the 
ships—no compensation without some actual physical damage.  There’re potentially 
damages that the municipalities could collect, if the spill impacted the beaches and they 
couldn't have tourists and things, people coming down to Galveston; that is a potential 
problem.  The Coast Guard and the . . . eventually, if the spill spread out to the parts of 
the Bay like over towards Anahuac and over in the West Bay, East Bay area, Bolivar, 
along the coastline and along the coastline of Smith Point and up towards Anahuac, in 
that area, and into Trinity Bay, NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration] would be on the scene trying to determine the extent of any natural 
resource damage or damage to resources.  The spill contractors would be looking to 
operate up in those areas, pick up any free oil in the water using skimmers or whatever 
they could.  They would also be looking possibly to use bio remediation in nearby 
marshy coastlands and things like that.  All that is going to be for the ticket.  The liability 
is going to be for the two spillers in this case and how they could sort it out.  But, you 
know, this scenario that we are talking about here should go into place immediately.  
That is the whole point.  Now, if, by some chance, the spillers don't respond, of course 
they are going to be an extremely different problem and people will probably go to jail.  
But the Coast Guard could respond in the even that the responsible parties do not 
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respond.  The [OPA 90] Act uses the term “responsible parties.”  Anyway, that is 
something I think should go on. 
 If one of the major oil companies is involved, if it was a vessel calling up their 
facility and they wouldn't have any liability or any legal responsibility to get involved, 
they might have some way of assisting or could assist the vessel owner in that case 
depending on the arrangement they had with the vessel or that kind of thing might be.  
But officially, it is the vessel owner who has got to have that response plan in place but 
how to activate that plan and follow through until the oil was cleaned up to the 
satisfaction of the Coast Guard.  And in this case, also the general land office would be 
on the scene from the state of Texas.  So, you'd have to have this combined effort with 
the Coast Guard, the general land office, the vessel owners and their representatives and 
the spill contractors would all be working together under a unified command on the Coast 
Guard's unified command to set up and respond to the spill. 
JT: Now, where does the oil spill liability trust fund, where would that come into play 
in a situation like that? 
BN: Potentially, state governments and local governments could make claims against 
the fund if they were not able to collect from the vessel owner.  You always have to make 
your claim against the responsible party first, then you go to the fund.  I understand it is 
pretty difficult to collect from the fund.  And third parties can also claim against the fund 
in the event they are unable to collect against the vessel owner. 
JT: So, OPA 90 provides an opportunity for injured parties to receive some financial . 
. .  
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BN: Yes, and I think that is the big difference between the amendments to Clean 
Water Act enacted under OPA 90 and the way the Clean Water Act was before—only 
municipalities, the state local governments, federal governments could collect for oil spill 
liability, oil spill damage.  OPA 90 opened it up to third party claims by private citizens 
who were damaged. 
JT: Explain just briefly bio-remediation. 
BN: As I understand it, it involves a process . . . they have developed a type of bacteria 
that eats constituents of oil and I think we are talking about persistent oil, something that 
doesn't have the type of toxicity you might have in some special chemical product or 
something like that.  And they spray this stuff over the affected area and the bacteria goes 
to work to start eating away at the oil, the residue of the oil.  I have seen pictures of areas 
in Galveston Bay where they have done this and it is amazing.  The good thing about it is 
you don't have to send anybody walking around in there trying to hand clean or skim an 
area of marshy grass and areas like that. 
Yeah, whatever, and you'd end up killing half the stuff in there anyway.  Oh, the 
other thing . . . you'd probably have these places that would be set up automatically . . . 
part of your response plan would have to include a group of people or whatever, the 
group that comes in and washes and cleans birds, wildlife response, that is part of the 
response plan.  It is interesting.  The way the response plan works, there is a national 
response plan and then a regional plan that OPA requires if you look at the statute.  The 
Coast Guard implements those at different levels.  And one of the things they have done 
is you can find coastline and maps that show the coastline of the bays and harbors and all 
HHA# 00653  Page 60 of 70 
Interviewee: Nicholas, Bob 
Interview: November 21, 2006, December 4, 2006 
University of Houston  Houston History Archives 
 
60 
those kinds of things, and those pretty much are designed to show if your spill contractor 
should have those.  You know, in looking at those, when you initiate the spill response, 
which of the real high risk areas that are likely to be impacted and how.  You know that 
just by looking at these, this work was done and these assessments were made some time 
after the statute was passed.  I think NOAA probably did most of that work, I believe.  I 
remember doing some drills, oil spill drills, in different parts of the country.  We always 
had those maps available. 
JT: Talk about the strike teams. 
BN: Those are Coast Guard strike teams and they will go in, for example, if there is a 
mystery spill of some significance and there is no identified responsible party, if it is bad 
enough, they will send in a strike team to do the clean up.  And, of course, always 
looking for a responsible party to tag in the event that, you know, they find somebody 
that is responsible.  But again, I mentioned that fact that if you don't report and they later 
catch you, you are going to face a felony charge just for failing to report less all the clean 
up costs and damages and maybe some additional criminal penalties under the statute. 
JT: It sounds like OPA has really put a lot of the burden on the Coast Guard and if 
you look at some of the things that have occurred recently with the big hurricanes and 
911, the Coast Guard really is now the definitive police of the waterways.  They really 
have a huge role to play in this. 
BN: Oh, yes.  I mean, every time you turn around, even with the passage of the 
Maritime Security Act in 2002, those poor guys keep getting their mission increased with 
more missions to perform, not just . . . probably back in the 1960s, a chief functioning 
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Coast Guard was SAR, search and rescue.  And then came all the pollution stuff and drug 
interdiction.  Customs is supposed to be involved in that but they do a lot of it.  Now, all 
the maritime security and the pollution enforcement of all the pollution laws and what 
you have to do—inspection of foreign flag ships, certification of foreign flag ships.  
Every foreign flag ship has to have a certificate of compliance letter, I guess.  Now, I 
think they have gone . . . it used to be tank vessels had a separate one called TVEL, tank 
vessel examination letter.  Now, everything is a certificate of compliance.  Crews ships, 
foreign crews ships have to have them, tankers, any type of cargo vessel or 
containerships, bulk carriers, anything that is foreign.  Once a year, you kind of have to 
renew that thing.  I know, too, when they implemented the Maritime Security Act and the 
International Ship Port Safety Security code.  Every ship coming through the Port of 
Houston…I remember being at a meeting at the Houston Pilots a couple of years ago.  
Every ship that comes into the Port of Houston that had not had a prior security 
inspection would not be allowed in until inspection was conducted.  And that meant you 
anchored at the offshore anchorage outside of Galveston.  No one was allowed on or off 
the ship.  No one could come and visit the ship because you hadn't cleared Customs and 
Immigration yet.  So, you were stuck out there until the Coast Guard did its thing and 
then Customs came on after them and cleared you.  And then, you could have your 
normal people, the ship's agents and owners, or prepare reps or whatever comes on board 
and start doing their thing when the ship came in but that was a very strict rule.  The 
Coast Guard, if you had not been inspected before, you know, you were going to have to 
wait your turn. 
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JT: In the 15 years of OPA 90 legislation, in your opinion, how has that legislation 
been effective in handling several dozens of minor spills that have occurred? 
BN: I think so.  I haven't heard much . . . of course, we have not had any real large 
spills.  Well, I say that . . . there have been some pretty good-sized spills on the West 
Coast out there with a ship I think that came, ran aground, came up on the beach and 
different things like that, with different issues involved.  I think the thing about it is, is the 
government had a lot more tools to work with now than he had before and being able to . 
. . well, in seeing that the vessel owner, first of all, is doing what it is supposed to do 
under the law and secondly, it has got resources that it can put into play in the event the 
vessel owner does not respond.  But I have not heard of a case involving a failure to 
respond.  Now, let's put it like this:  If you have, and this is supposed to change now but 
this is only within the last year—the spill response plan requirements only by the tankers, 
tank vessels, ships and barges—a couple of years ago, they went ahead and implemented 
a change in the law requiring nontank vessels above I think it is 300 gross tons threshold 
size to have spill response plans.  You could have a large container ship that carries quite 
a bit of fuel that could have a spill.  So now, and I think this is a direct result also of some 
causalities involving these ships, there was . . . it wasn't a tanker—I can't remember . . . it 
went on the beach out there in Oregon—I think there was a large spill associated with the 
grounding and breakup of the ship, the Coast Guard had to respond to that entirely, it was 
a government response.  That was some of the impetus behind  driving the change in 
legislation to include nontankers, which makes sense. 
JT: And that has been amended since 1990? 
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BN: Oh, yes.  The last couple of years I think.  And the Coast Guard is still in the 
process of implementing that.  There were some guidelines they put out or a NVIC that 
came out, Navigation Vessel Inspection Circular.  The law is already in effect so they just 
need to . . . they really ought to come out with some regulations. 
JT: So, what does this tell us about the broader issue of the state of environmental 
issues in maritime in the oil industry? 
BN: Well, you know, OPA 90 extended offshore, too.  You've got requirements for 
spill response from offshore facilities and that type of thing so I think it has heightened 
the awareness of how anybody operates in the U.S. and out of the U.S. or offshore on the 
U.S.  And if you have a spill, they know you've got to report it and you know that the 
Coast Guard is coming, and the MMS is going to be there, too [laughing].  
JT: Well, it sounded like it is getting difficult, meaning more expensive and more 
responsibility on the part of the industry.  Is this beneficial—meaning OPA 90—is it 
beneficial to the U.S. industry or does this lead us to more foreign outsourcing?  Being 
that it is more expensive, more liability, more responsibility. 
BN: Well, that is hard to answer.  I guess if you look at . . . we've got still a very active 
offshore drilling program in the Gulf of Mexico.  Those are all federal leases because of 
their location, as a tremendous amount of oil is being found out there.  That will help the 
demand for oil situation in this country but it is such a huge demand, I don't know . . . 
what you are talking about here is energy policy and I know very little about energy 
policy other than we should have made changes a long time ago to make ourselves less . . 
. decrease our demand for foreign oil and our use of oil as our primary energy source.  
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But, you know, nuclear energy got rejected and been rejected and you know there are all 
kinds of issues involved in that.  Of course, Americans in love with their cars here and all 
that kind of stuff.  I don't know.  Maybe this tells the story.  The majority of the income 
that a company like Exxon makes, for example, probably as high as 80 percent of their 
income does not come from the U.S.  It comes from outside the U.S.  And most of the 
money they spend on development is outside the U.S.  This is a very mature market.  
They still have refineries here but nobody is going to go out and build a new refinery.  I 
don't care what you change in the law . . . that is another issue.  It is not only the demand 
for the oil but there is also a very . . . I think we are stretched pretty close to the limit on 
refining capacity.  And the other thing bad about it is most of it is located on the Gulf 
Coast so you disrupt oil production in the Gulf of Mexico and also do damage to the 
refining capacity like a lot of it is over the New Orleans/Baton Rouge area, your supply 
of gasoline and motor gasoline and refined petroleum product drops off, so there is a big 
requirement then to start having to move the stuff in from foreign sources.  But I don't 
know; there are a lot of things I think we could have done different with respect to the 
energy policy in this country in the last 50 years.  It seems like we didn't learn anything 
from the embargo, the oil embargos of the 1970s.  We didn't learn anything from that at 
all.  And I have heard people in the oil industry say that the only energy policy this 
country has had over the last 50 years is to buy all the cheap Middle East oil we could 
buy.  Well, it is not cheap anymore. 
 You know, it is kind of interesting.  I saw something in the Oil and Gas Journal 
about one month ago . . . there was a big congressional investigation after the prices had 
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gone up of gasoline and I never saw this in the newspaper, but the congressional 
committee found that the cartel or OPEC was doing everything it could to manipulate 
prices to keep them high by curtailing production.  You saw that recently.  They curtailed 
production to get the price back up or keep it high.  We are at the mercy of these folks.  I 
don't know. 
 You talk about outsourcing.  I know the oil companies, but they are not probably 
unique have outsourced some of their payroll activities and things like that but that is just 
corporate America that has done a lot of that.  I don't think they are any different from 
anybody else.  I don't know that that has anything to do with any of this, I think that just 
has a typical . . .  
JT: Well, if you are using Exxon as an example, they are one of half a dozen of the 
big hitters that could afford to do stuff like that.  Let's pay attention to the guys like you 
and I who may want to go into the industry, the smaller guys.  Is it going to get to a point 
to where environmentally, liability speaking, that it is going to be too expensive for the 
Americans like you and I to operate in this maritime environment?  
BN: I think probably it already is.  I think it already is.  And, in fact, one of the 
comments when I was looking through some of your questions, one of the comments that 
I got from the people I talked to about people wanting to go into this business or go into 
the industry or actually get a job as a ship's captain or work on a barge or tug . . .. people 
don't do that anymore because of the fear of the penalties, the criminal penalties that are 
potentially involved now.  If I see one thing, it is a tragedy and I don't think it is the right 
way to go, is the further criminalization of ordinary negligent conduct.  And eventually, 
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we are going to have so many people put in jail in this country, I think our primary 
business is going to be keeping people locked up.  That is my own opinion.  I mean, we 
just can't continue to keep criminalizing ordinary negligent conduct and that is what 
we've done.  If he has an oil spill, you want to put people in jail.  And one of the things I 
think I mentioned to you earlier, too, there are limits on how far you can go with this 
criminal prosecution thing because the liability underwriters basically have told state 
local governments or federal governments too, if you get convictions against people here 
for inordinate criminal statutes where it says the conduct is more than negligent or 
willful… 
[Tape Three, Side Two] 
BN: Anyway, what is coming, though, is the fact that conviction in connection with an 
oil spill, conviction of the company or an individual with the company that the conduct 
was other than ordinary to negligent conduct, willful misconduct, something like that, 
underwriters could deny any claim for liability.  Underwriters could deny liability on the 
basis that they don't carry . . . insurance is not designed to cover your willful conduct.  
For example, you get in a wreck in a car and you were negligent, you ran a red light or 
something, you weren't paying attention to what you were doing, your insurance will 
cover you for that.  But if you see somebody going through a light and it is already red 
and you decide, I just want to go deliberately hit this car, or T-bone him, your carrier 
won't pay for that kind of conduct.  I don't know; that has got to be sorted out.  But, you 
know, there is always some federal prosecutor or state prosecutor now that wants to make 
a name for themselves out here ready to prosecute whatever XYZ company or individual 
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operating the tug boat or the barge.  In fact, this doesn't involve an oil spill but the 
German ship that knocked a crane down over in Mobile, Alabama, the company has pled 
guilty to a criminal charge and the owner . .  .the captain has already been convicted.  He 
is supposed to be sentenced here.  I am supposed to be talking about this in a couple of 
weeks, as a matter of fact, one week from Friday at the Council of Master Mariners here 
in Houston.  But another example of how ordinary negligent conduct is criminalized. 
JT: Well, let's wrap this up, Mr. Bob.  What ever became of the Exxon Valdez? 
BN: After the incident, the ship went to NASCO, National Steel and Shipbuilding in 
San Diego where it was originally built and was repaired.  Before it came out, the Exxon 
Shipping Company had been reorganized and a different company now was going to 
operate a ship called SeaRiver Maritime, Inc., so the name of the ship was changed to the 
S/R Mediterranean.  The ship, as a result of OPA 90, a provision of OPA 90, was not 
allowed to trade in the Prince William Sound.  A court battle over that resulted in that 
being upheld.  And the ship, for a long time, until I would say probably the last 10, 12 
years, 13 years, was used primarily over in Europe by Exxon and traded out in the Middle 
East.  Also loaded oil in the North Sea.  Basically operated in European waters.  
Sometimes to the Far East. 
JT: Now, what happens when it is not a shipping company? 
BN: Hold on just a second . . . and then, I think within the last year, the ship was 
transferred from the U.S. flag to the Marshall Islands flag.  Now, I don't know if it is still 
owned—I was trying to find out today if it was still owned by Exxon Corporation or 
through a foreign affiliate or whatever but it is no longer an American flag ship.  So, 
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Exxon Shipping Company is still around.  It has all the liability associated with the 
Valdez accident.  It does not have any assets although the Exxon Corporation has 
assumed whatever liability.  Nobody is going to walk away empty-handed because Exxon 
Shipping Company doesn't have assets. 
JT: They are no longer in shipping crude? 
BN: No.  SeaRiver is still around and SeaRiver still operates in Alaskan ships about 6 
or 7, 5 or 6 ships, out of Alaska.   
JT: What happened to Captain Hazelwood?  Where is he today? 
BN: He works for the Fowler Rodriguez law firm in New York as a paralegal handling 
cargo claims, the last I had heard.  Never had a chance to go back to sea. 
JT: And I believe—correct me if I am wrong—$5 billion in punitive damages lawsuit, 
where is that today? 
BN: Well, it got reversed a number of times and every time we get sent back to the 9th 
Circuit Court of Appeals to the federal court in Alaska, the judge reinstates it and it keeps 
getting bumped back to the 9th Circuit.  So that is where it is now.  I think it has gone 
back to the 9th Circuit. 
JT: Now, you experienced first-hand a massive ecological disaster brought on by 
negligence.  What has the industry and our government learned from this? 
BN: I could talk to you about that another hour.  Why don't we start off with that 
question next time? 
JT: How about this, this last question for today, Mr. Bob:  That telephone call that 
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you received the day after, how did that change your life? 
BN: Oh, man, I'm telling you.  It is kind of one of these events that is a career 
changing event or life changing event that occurred . . . the way it happened for me 
anyway . . . there was my life before it and my life afterwards.  And it changed quite a 
bit.  I think the way you look at things . . . I know one of the things it did, when I came 
back, I mean, from the time I spent up there although the whole experience lasted for 
years, you get to the point where the small problems that you encounter on a daily basis 
don't mean a whole lot to you anymore.  They are pale in significance to the kinds of 
things that you see happening when you are part of something like this.  I think the other 
thing is if I take away anything is or remember anything about it, it was working with the 
people that I had grown up with at Exxon and how hard those people, especially the 
people on the ship and what they did—they wouldn't get off that ship.  You couldn't have 
pried them off there or ordered off there.  They wanted to do whatever they could to save 
that ship, to salvage it and get it out of there.  And they did.  I mean, people were working 
themselves to death up there, just very little sleep, working around the clock, a lot of men 
and women with a lot of courage, a lot of guts.  Those people will never be recognized.  
Exxon and everybody associated with Exxon will always be looked at as the villains in 
this particular incident.  But if I have any feelings at all, it is of a great sense of pride that 
I was able to work with these people and be there for them the best I could be.  And I 
miss that.  I really miss being away from the ships and the people.  Of course, I am old 
enough now where I don't particularly want to be climbing around some ship or barge in 
the middle of the night anymore.  I did my time doing that.  But those were a great bunch 
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of folks and still are.  
[End of tape] 
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